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The Issue
The Working Group on Social Responsibility
(WGSR) of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) will meet in
Copenhagen from May 17 to 21, 2010 for
what is likely to be its last meeting to work on
ISO 26000, an international guide on social
responsibility. One of the central challenges
for the WGSR is to define the scope of an
organization’s responsibility for human rights
abuses committed by third parties. Should an
apparel company be responsible for violations
of workers’ rights in its suppliers’ factories?
Should a mining company be responsible for
illegal killings and assaults by private security
forces contracted to protect its assets and
personnel? Should manufacturers of law
enforcement equipment be responsible when
police use them to suppress lawful assembly
and expression? In short, where and how
should the boundaries of an organization’s
responsibility be drawn when actors outside
the organization violate human rights?
ISO 26000, approved by a large
majority in a recent “Draft International
Standard” ballot, answers this question
largely in terms of an organization’s degree of
control or influence over others’ conduct.
This “leverage-based” approach is based on
the concept of “sphere of influence”,
introduced into SR discourse by the United
Nations Global Compact. Professor John
Ruggie, the Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary General on Business
and Human Rights (SRSG), has warned the
WGSR not to take this approach, calling it
inconsistent with his three-part “protect,
respect, remedy” framework. 1
Although Professor Ruggie’s views
deserve great respect, ISO 26000 should
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maintain its “sphere of influence” approach
because:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

It reflects broad societal expectations
It is consistent with “due diligence”
It does not encourage inappropriate
political interference
It does not encourage “gaming”
It is simple and intuitive
It builds on existing ISO standards
It avoids making a false distinction
between supporting human rights and
avoiding abuses
It is a necessary part of the solution
to the business and human rights
problem.

Fulfilling Societal Expectations
Decades of anti-sweatshop campaigns and
consumer boycotts show that social actors –
citizens, consumers, workers, indigenous and
local communities, NGOs – will hold
businesses accountable for the way in which
they exercise or fail to exercise the influence
they have over others to prevent or lessen
human rights abuses. As one report put it,
“society at large will hold a company
responsible for violations occurring in plants
from which it sources products or services,
and therefore over which it has a degree of
influence.” 2
ISO 26000 reflects this widespread
societal expectation when it says that “there
will be situations where an organization’s
ability to influence others will be
accompanied by a responsibility to exercise
that influence…. Generally, the responsibility
for exercising influence increases with the
ability to influence.” 3 This is in line with the
Global Compact’s E-Learning tool, which
says: “the more control, authority or influence
a business has over a situation giving rise to
human rights abuses (or the means to improve
respect for human rights), the greater the
business responsibility to act.” 4
Promoting Due Diligence
The “sphere of influence” approach is
consistent with and supports the concept of
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due diligence which lies at the heart of the
corporate responsibility to respect human
rights. According to Professor Ruggie, due
diligence “comprises reasonable steps by
companies to become aware of, prevent, and
address adverse impacts of their activities and
relationships.” 5 For him, “sphere of influence
remains a useful metaphor for companies to
think broadly about their human rights
responsibilities and opportunities beyond the
workplace” but “is of limited utility in
clarifying the specific parameters of their
responsibility to respect human rights”
because it conflates “impacts” with
“leverage”. 6
In Professor Ruggie’s view, the scope
of social responsibility is defined by “the
actual and potential human rights impacts
generated through a company’s own business
activities and through its relationships with
other parties,” not by leverage. 7 Corporations
are responsible for their contributions to the
actions of others, most importantly in the
form of complicity in human rights abuses,
which he defines as knowing contribution to
another’s abuse of human rights. 8
What Professor Ruggie fails to
acknowledge, and what ISO 26000 and the
Global Compact recognize, is that an
organization may contribute to human rights
abuses by acts of omission as well as
commission. When an organization has the
ability to prevent or mitigate adverse human
rights impacts by exercising influence over an
actor with whom it is in a relationship, yet
elects deliberately not to exercise that
influence, it contributes to the resulting abuse.
Its degree of complicity and hence
responsibility may be less than if it had
actively conspired with the abuser, but it is
implicated nonetheless.
Discouraging Political Interference
Professor Ruggie asserts that it is undesirable
“to require companies to act wherever they
have influence, particularly over
Governments.” 9 Presumably, what makes this
undesirable is the possibility of inappropriate
meddling in public policy. Yet surely such
irresponsible political involvement would be
inconsistent with social responsibility by
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definition. Social responsibility includes
responsible involvement in politics and public
policy, as ISO 26000 recognizes. 10
The only reason to conclude that
leverage-based social responsibility is not
desirable is if one believes that organizations
are bound to exercise their political influence
irresponsibly. If this is true, the entire project
of social responsibility is in jeopardy. If, on
the other hand, organizations can exercise
their influence responsibly, there is no reason
not to demand they do so.
Discouraging Strategic Gaming
Professor Ruggie warns that “using influence
as a basis for assigning responsibility invites
strategic manipulation.” 11 In his most recent
report he explains that
the proposition that corporate human
rights responsibilities as a general rule
should be determined by companies’
capacity, whether absolute or relative
to States, is troubling. On that
premise, a large and profitable
company operating in a small and
poor country could soon find itself
called upon to perform everexpanding social and even governance
functions – lacking democratic
legitimacy, diminishing the State’s
incentive to build sustainable capacity
and undermining the company’s own
economic role and possibly its
commercial viability. Indeed, the
proposition invites undesirable
strategic gaming in any kind of
country context. 12
The concern seems to be that
leverage-based corporate responsibility will
give governments an incentive to shirk their
responsibilities in the hope that companies
will step in to fill the breach. But the state’s
responsibility to protect human rights is
independent of business’s responsibility to
respect. The state’s potential liability for
neglecting or violating human rights is not
diminished by corporate action to support
those same rights. Only the most
unscrupulous governments would treat such a
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situation as an excuse to shirk their legal
responsibilities, and those governments would
likely neglect their duty to protect human
rights regardless of how the corporate
responsibility to respect is defined.
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approach he rejects. In his view, to determine
the scope of its responsibility a company
should:
•

Promoting Simplicity

•

Sphere of influence may be a metaphor, but it
is one that organizations and stakeholders of
all kinds can understand intuitively. The idea
of concentric circles of influence radiating
outward from the organization is simple. It
subsumes a wide variety of relationships with
different forms and pathways of influence
under a single simple principle: the more
influence the organization has over processes
and outcomes, the more responsibility it has
to exercise its influence.
There are various ways to
operationalize the concept of sphere of
influence, including the principle of
“proximity” 13 and the UN Global Compact’s
“Arc of Human Rights Priorities” with its
twin axes of human rights impact and
connection to the company. 14 Ruggie rejects
the concept of proximity because it is unclear
(e.g. what does “political proximity” mean?)
and in some cases misleading (e.g.
“geographic proximity” may obscure the fact
that actions can affect people far away). He
concludes that “it is not proximity that
determines whether or not a human rights
impact falls within the responsibility to
respect, but rather the company’s web of
activities and relationships”. 15
It is hard to imagine how the term
“web of activities and relationships” is any
clearer than proximity, a concept familiar to
lawyers worldwide. Proximity plays a central
role in private law in all the common law
countries, as well as in international law. 16
Among other things, it is central to legal
concepts of causation (“proximate cause”),
foreseeability and duty of care. While its
meaning is open-textured and contextdependent, millions of legal practitioners and
judges employ it routinely to resolve disputes.
Professor Ruggie proposes a three-part
process to determine the scope of a
company’s responsibility that is at least as
abstract and vague as the “leverage-based”

•

understand the country context within
which it operates;
assess the impacts of its own
activities; and
analyze whether it might contribute to
abuses through its relationships with
third parties. 17

How organizations, let alone their
stakeholders, are expected to translate these
factors into concrete limits on social
responsibility is far from clear. How does a
country’s human rights context affect the
firm’s degree of responsibility? How does
one distinguish between an organization’s
“own” activities and those of “others”? Two
examples Ruggie gives of a firm’s “own”
activities, having “direct impact,” are political
lobbying and the provision of security for
personnel and assets. These are odd
examples, since security and lobbying
functions are typically entrusted to third
parties. Moreover the impact of lobbying on
human rights is indirect since it is the
implementation of laws and policies that
affects human rights, not the lobbying
activities that may have influenced their
content. By presenting security and lobbying
as activities with direct impacts, Professor
Ruggie adds to the confusion surrounding
these issues.
Nor is it clear what kind or degree of
contribution to abuse through an
organization’s relationships is sufficient to
attract responsibility. On one hand, Professor
Ruggie writes that “[a]voiding complicity is
part and parcel of due diligence for ensuring
that companies respect human rights”. 18 On
the other hand, he suggests that other forms of
involvement might also give rise to
responsibility.
One example is knowingly benefiting
from another’s abuse of human rights, which
Professor Ruggie suggests is included in the
scope of the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights even if the firm did not
contribute to the abuse. 19 He also seems to
suggest that a company’s mere presence in a
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setting where human rights abuses take place
may give rise to responsibility: “operating in
contexts where abuses occur and the
appearance of benefiting from such abuses
should serve as red flags for companies to
ensure that they exercise due diligence”. 20
Other forms of involvement are suggested by
his admonition that a company should “assess
whether it might contribute to or be
associated with harm caused by entities with
which it conducts, or is considering
conducting business or other activities” and
“ensure that the company is not complicit, or
otherwise implicated in human rights harms
caused by others”. 21
In short, for all his emphasis on due
diligence and complicity, Professor Ruggie is
ultimately unclear about what kind and degree
of connection to third-party human rights
violations is sufficient to engage corporate
responsibility.
As Professor Ruggie acknowledges,
determination of the scope of the
responsibility to respect is bound to be
inductive and fact-based. 22 This is no
different from the “sphere of influence”
approach he rejects. The latter, however,
offers the advantage of conceptual simplicity:
a firm’s leverage varies on a continuum from
no influence to complete control, and its
responsibility varies with its degree of
leverage: the more leverage, the more
responsibility.
Building on Existing Standards
The sphere of influence approach fits well
with existing widely accepted standards,
including ISO 14001. ISO 14001, the world’s
leading environmental management system
standard, recognizes that to be considered
environmentally responsible, an organization
should identify and manage the environmental
aspects of its activities, products and services
that it can control and those it can influence.
The European Union’s voluntary EcoManagement and Audit Scheme (EMAS)
does likewise.
While there is a lively debate over
how to operationalize the principle of control
and influence, and how far up or down the
value chain it extends, the worldwide
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environmental management community is in
agreement on the basic proposition: an
environmental management system should
address the environmental aspects over which
an organization determines it has control or
influence. ISO 26000 should take a page
from ISO 14001 and affirm that to call itself
socially responsible, an organization should
answer for human rights abuses it can control
and those it can influence.
Avoiding False Distinctions
“Asking companies to support human rights
voluntarily where they have leverage is one
thing,” writes Professor Ruggie, “but
attributing responsibility to them on that basis
alone is quite another”. 23 This statement
presupposes a sharp distinction between the
purely voluntary activity of promoting human
rights and the obligatory responsibility of
avoiding human rights abuses. 24
But promotion of human rights and
avoidance of abuse are regions on a
continuum, not the two mutually exclusive
parts of a dichotomy. The transition between
them is gradual and continuous, not abrupt.
Leverage over other actors is just as relevant
to defining the one as it is to the other, as ISO
26000 recognizes when it says “an
organization has the responsibility to respect
human rights, including in its sphere of
influence”. 25 The utility of the concept of
sphere of influence is not limited to the
context of voluntary human rights promotion.
Solving the Business-Human Rights
Problem
Ultimately, an approach that limits corporate
responsibility to positive acts of commission
while ignoring acts of omission is bound to
fail. An approach that calibrates
responsibility to an organization’s degree of
control and influence over adverse human
rights impacts is needed to solve the businesshuman rights problem. Acting responsibly
within an organization’s own workplace is the
least of the problems facing social
responsibility (not that it is a small problem).
The real challenge of social
responsibility lies in an organization’s
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relationships with contractors, suppliers,
customers, local communities and end users.
Organizations often have substantial influence
over the decisions and actions of these actors.
While ISO 26000 is right to
acknowledge that an organization “cannot be
held responsible for the impacts of every
party over which it may have some
influence,” 26 it should equally acknowledge
that the problem of human rights abuses
cannot be solved by allowing organizations
simply to wash their hands of abuses
perpetrated by actors with whom they have a
significant relationship and over whom they
have a significant degree of influence.
Only by affirming that a firm’s
responsibility varies with its ability to
influence decisions and actions will social
responsibility standards galvanize the sort of
changes that are needed to improve respect
for and realization of human rights.
Conclusion
The concept of sphere of influence is central
to ISO 26000’s definition of social
responsibility. It is integrated throughout the
document. While its use in ISO 26000 suffers
from some awkwardness and inconsistency
(as do many other aspects of the document), it
sends the right general message. With the
greatest respect for Professor Ruggie, the
WGSR should not change ISO 26000 to
accommodate his concerns.
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